Saudi F-35 Approval Reopens Türkiye’s Stalled Fighter Question

The State Department’s approval of a $24.3 billion F-35 sale to Saudi Arabia on September 17 has reopened one of the most awkward questions in Turkish defence policy: after paying roughly $1.4 billion into the Joint Strike Fighter programme and waiting more than six years, why does Türkiye still not have a single F-35, or even a signed contract for one?

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress that Saudi Arabia could buy up to 48 F-35A conventional take-off jets and 49 Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines — 48 installed plus one spare — along with associated munitions, electronic warfare systems and logistics support. The sale, still subject to congressional review, would make Saudi Arabia the first Arab state to operate the aircraft.

The timing was pointed. A day later, New Welfare Party (YRP) leader Fatih Erbakan used the Saudi announcement to press the government publicly. “Where are the F-35 fighter jets for which we paid in advance and were a partner in the project?” he asked on X, adding that Türkiye still has “no signature, no timetable and no legal guarantee.” He also recalled that Donald Trump had promised movement on the file at the NATO summit in Ankara in July — a promise that, more than two months on, has not translated into a deal.

How Türkiye Ended Up on the Outside

Türkiye was an original Level 3 industrial partner in the F-35 programme and had planned to buy 100 aircraft to replace its ageing F-16 and F-4 fleets, with Turkish Aerospace and other local suppliers producing structural components for the global F-35 supply chain. Washington began unwinding that role in 2019, after Ankara took delivery of the first batteries of Russia’s S-400 air defence system, arguing that operating the S-400 alongside the F-35 would let Moscow study the jet’s stealth signature. Türkiye disputed that reasoning but was formally removed from the programme, and in December 2020 the United States added CAATSA sanctions against the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) itself over the S-400 purchase — sanctions still on the books today.

At the Ankara NATO summit on July 7-8, Trump told reporters “we’re going to be taking the sanctions off; it’s time” and said he would “certainly” consider selling F-35s to Türkiye. Both statements raised expectations in Ankara. Neither has yet produced a lifted sanction, a congressional notification or a contract. Lawmakers who have blocked earlier attempts to unwind CAATSA point to the same unresolved issue Washington raised in 2019: the S-400 batteries remain in Turkish hands, and critics in Congress argue that any F-35 sale still risks exposing the jet’s systems to a NATO ally that also operates Russian equipment.

A Separate, Live Dispute Over F-16s

While the F-35 file is stalled, Türkiye’s parallel F-16 purchase — the fallback deal signed after the F-35 removal — has itself been renegotiated downward. The package approved by the State Department in January 2024 covered 40 new Block 70 jets and 79 modernisation kits for Türkiye’s existing fleet, valued at roughly $23 billion. Ankara later dropped the kits after concluding it could handle the upgrades domestically, and Defence Minister Yaşar Güler said in November 2024 that the trimmed package, covering only the 40 new aircraft, was worth around $7 billion. Türkiye had already paid $1.4 billion toward the programme.

Negotiations with Lockheed Martin have not been straightforward. Reported disputes centre on how much Türkiye should pay toward new production-line costs and mission-computer upgrades, and on Ankara’s request for access to the F-16’s mission-computer source code so it can integrate Turkish-developed sensors and weapons — a request Washington has historically resisted for security reasons.

One development could shift that dynamic. The US Air Force is now examining whether to order newly built F-16s for its own fleet for the first time since 2005, as a stopgap while F-35A and F-15EX production runs remain capacity-constrained — a consideration sharpened by an F-35 mission-capable rate that the Government Accountability Office says fell from 67 percent in fiscal 2021 to 44 percent in fiscal 2025. If the Air Force does become a customer of the same Lockheed Martin line in South Carolina, industry analysts note that the cost of expanding production capacity would be spread across a broader customer base rather than loaded onto Turkish unit prices alone — arguably strengthening Ankara’s hand in the cost dispute, even as the F-35 question remains separately frozen.

Why This Matters Beyond Ankara

For Riyadh, the approval is a geopolitical marker as much as a hardware deal: it would give Saudi Arabia a fifth-generation fighter that not even Türkiye, a NATO member and longtime F-35 partner nation, currently possesses. That contrast is exactly what Turkish opposition figures are using to press the government, and it puts renewed pressure on Washington to explain what, specifically, still stands between the CAATSA sanctions and a resolution nearly six years after Türkiye’s removal from the programme.

It also sharpens the case, inside Türkiye’s own defence establishment, for continuing to hedge rather than wait. Ankara has spent the interim building alternatives it does control: KAAN, the indigenous fifth-generation fighter now moving toward serial production and already under contract to Indonesia; a growing Eurofighter Typhoon relationship, with Turkish pilots now training in the United Kingdom; and continued investment in Türkiye’s defence budget that underpins both programmes. None of those fully substitutes for the F-35’s combat record or logistics network in the near term, but they mean Türkiye’s air power planning no longer depends solely on Washington’s decision — a point underscored separately by the US Navy’s own interest in a Turkish-designed warship, a reminder that the defence relationship between the two NATO allies runs in more than one direction. Questions about technology-transfer restrictions on Turkish exports more broadly are addressed in our explainer on whether Turkish weapons are ITAR-free.

No new contract, sanctions relief or delivery schedule has been announced. Until one is, the Saudi deal will keep serving as the most visible reminder — for Turkish opposition politicians and for Türkiye’s own air force planners — of a promise made in Ankara in July that has yet to be kept.

Sources

• US Department of State, F-35 Lightning II notification for Saudi Arabia, September 17, 2026
• Turkish Minute, “Opposition leader asks where Turkey’s F-35s are after US clears Saudi sale,” September 18, 2026
• TURDEF, “USAF F-16 Return Puts F-35 and Türkiye Deal in Focus”
• Defense News, reporting on the July 2026 Ankara NATO summit and CAATSA sanctions statements