Who Really Owns Türkiye’s Defence Industry, From the Armed Forces Foundation to Private Groups
Ask who owns Türkiye’s defence industry and the short answer sounds like a riddle: a foundation that belongs to the armed forces, a presidential agency that buys from companies it also helps own, a ministry-run arsenal, and a handful of private groups that have grown fast enough to rival all of them. The map is not a single holding structure. It is several ownership channels that happen to feed the same procurement system.
This guide lays out those channels, who sits at the top of each, and where the lines between “state”, “foundation” and “private” blur.
What Is the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, and Why Does It Matter?
The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TSKGV, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı) was set up in 1987, bringing together the older land, naval and air force foundations (founded in 1974, 1972 and 1970 respectively, according to the foundation’s history page), to channel money into the modernisation of the military. It is a foundation, not a government department, yet its board of trustees is dominated by state officials. According to the foundation’s own account of its governance, as reported by Defence Turkey magazine, the board includes the President, the Vice President, the Minister of National Defence, the Chief of General Staff and the head of the Secretariat of Defence Industries (SSB).
The model is unusual. Rather than hand its capital to a ministry, the foundation invested in industrial companies and recycles their profits into the armed forces’ needs. Defence Turkey reported on the foundation’s 30th anniversary that it held more than half of the capital in six companies and minority stakes in 29 others. The six majority holdings it named were ASELSAN, Turkish Aerospace (TUSAŞ), ROKETSAN, HAVELSAN, İşbir and Aspilsan. The same report gave 2016 group figures, including consolidated sales of about 7.8 billion lira and an export share of 31 percent. Those are old numbers, and the structure has since moved on, but they show how large the foundation’s industrial arm had become by the end of its third decade.
Which Companies Does the Foundation Control?
| Company | Ownership picture (as reported) | Main field |
|---|---|---|
| ASELSAN | TSKGV about 74.2 percent, remainder traded on Borsa Istanbul | Radar, electronic warfare, electro-optics, communications |
| Turkish Aerospace (TUSAŞ) | TSKGV about 54.5 percent, Defence Industry Agency (SSB) about 45.5 percent, a small remainder held by the Turkish Aeronautical Association | Fighter, trainer and helicopter programmes, UAVs |
| ROKETSAN | TSKGV the largest shareholder at roughly 55 percent, with ASELSAN, MKE and VakıfBank among the other holders | Missiles and rockets |
| HAVELSAN | Subsidiary of TSKGV, which has held roughly 98 percent since the company was nationalised in 1985 | Software, command and control, simulation |
Percentages in this table come from company filings, encyclopedic summaries and press reports of different dates. Share structures shift with capital increases, so treat them as approximate and check the latest public disclosure before quoting one.
ASELSAN is the clearest case because it is the only one of the group listed on the exchange. The foundation holds about three quarters of it; the rest floats. That is why the company publishes detailed shareholder data through the Public Disclosure Platform (KAP) while its siblings do not. For the company’s own story, see our ASELSAN company profile.
ROKETSAN’s cap table is a good example of cross-holdings. Reported shareholders include ASELSAN and the state arsenal MKE, which means a foundation company, a ministry-owned company and a state-owned bank all sit in the same register. Our ROKETSAN company profile covers its missile lines, and HAVELSAN is covered separately for the software side.
What Does the Defence Industry Agency (SSB) Actually Do?
The SSB is not an owner in the way the foundation is. It is the buyer, the planner and, increasingly, the export coordinator. Established under Law No. 3238 in 1985 as the Defence Industry Development and Support Administration, it became affiliated with the Presidency in July 2018 under Presidential Decree No. 7. Its president since June 2023 is Prof. Haluk Görgün. The agency describes itself as the sole government procurement authority in the sector and says it runs more than 750 projects.
Three pieces make up the formal system. The SSB itself does the project management and contracting. The Defence Industry Executive Committee sets direction; under the 2018 decree it is chaired by the President and includes the Vice President, the interior and defence ministers, the Chief of General Staff and the SSB head. The Defence Industry Support Fund pays for the work. All three answer to the Presidency.
The agency also owns equity directly. TUSAŞ is the biggest example: SSB holds close to 45 percent. STM, the engineering and project-management company behind programmes such as the Kargu loitering munition and several naval projects, is reported to be an SSB subsidiary, founded in 1991 on a decision of the Executive Committee. See our STM company profile for its portfolio.
This is where the structure gets interesting. SSB signs contracts with TUSAŞ and STM, and also owns part of them. Proponents see that as alignment, the state steering a strategic supplier. Others note the thin line between buyer and seller. Both readings fit the same facts.
Where Does the State Arsenal Fit?
MKE, the Mechanical and Chemical Industry Corporation, is the oldest piece. It was founded in 1950 and, according to its public profile, is owned entirely by the state. It moved under the Ministry of National Defence in 2000. Ammunition, artillery, small arms and propellants are its heartland, and it has recently been building plants abroad. Our MKE profile traces that expansion.
MKE is neither a foundation company nor a private one. It reports through the ministry, which is why it appears alongside the foundation firms only as a shareholder in places like ROKETSAN.
How Big Is the Private Sector?
Large. The older picture of a state-and-foundation monopoly no longer holds. Several of the biggest names are private:
- Baykar is family-controlled and self-financed, built around the Bayraktar family. Its ownership is covered in who owns Baykar.
- Otokar, founded in 1963, belongs to Koç Holding and is usually described as the country’s largest privately owned defence company.
- FNSS was a joint venture of Nurol Holding (51 percent) and BAE Systems (49 percent). Defence Turkey and EDR reported in 2024 that Nurol would acquire BAE’s stake, pending competition approval.
- BMC is a Turkish-Qatari armoured vehicle maker. Reports indicate a majority stake went to steelmaker Tosyalı Holding, with Qatar’s armed forces industry committee holding about 49.9 percent.
The practical difference shows up in how the groups fund themselves. Foundation companies reinvest into the foundation and its mission; private groups answer to owners and, in Otokar’s case, shareholders of a listed holding. Yet all of them sell largely to the same buyer, the SSB, and all of them need state export licences.
Does Ownership Change How Turkish Defence Is Bought?
It shapes it more than the formal rules suggest. The foundation model means profits from ASELSAN or ROKETSAN return to military modernisation instead of vanishing into general budgets, a point foundation officials make often. The SSB’s role as both customer and shareholder gives it leverage over delivery schedules and localisation targets. The agency also coordinates export activity for the sector, so the same office that writes the requirement helps decide where the product can be sold. Its export and localisation claims are tracked in our report on SSB’s export and localisation figures.
That combination explains a pattern visible across the industry. A programme usually starts as an SSB requirement, passes to a foundation or private prime for development, draws on a state research body for core design work, and ends in an armed forces order. TÜBİTAK SAGE, the state missile design institute, is one such node and is profiled in our TÜBİTAK SAGE article. Ownership, in other words, is only half the picture; the contract chain matters as much as the share register.
The weak spots are well known. Cross-holdings make it harder for outsiders to read who controls what. Foundation companies face few of the disclosure demands of listed ones. And the buyer-owner overlap invites questions that no public document has settled.
For readers tracking a specific company, the practical rule is simple. Check the listed filing if there is one, the SSB’s own annual reports for state holdings, and the company’s official page for the rest, since percentages move. The map above is accurate as a structure even where individual stakes have changed.
