Which NATO Members Operate Turkish Defence Systems?

Romania’s vessel came through an intergovernmental agreement rather than a commercial contract, one of three distinct routes by which a government buys Turkish equipment. Eight NATO member states besides Türkiye have signed contracts for Turkish-built military equipment: Spain, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Portugal, Croatia and Albania. Between them they have ordered advanced jet trainers, armed drones, more than 1,400 armoured vehicles and two naval logistics ships. NATO itself has also become a customer, awarding ASELSAN a three-year contract through the NATO Support and Procurement Agency in January 2026. Türkiye’s own government puts the share of defence and aerospace exports going to NATO countries at 57.3 per cent — a majority of the industry’s foreign sales now stay inside the alliance.

The number that changed the conversation

For most of the past decade, the story of Turkish defence exports was told through Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Libya and a string of African and Central Asian buyers. That is no longer where the money is.

Türkiye’s defence and aerospace exports reached $10.9 billion in the 12 months from 1 June 2025 to 31 May 2026, up 47.1 per cent year-on-year, according to figures from the Turkish Defence and Aerospace Industry Exporters’ Association reported by Anadolu Agency in July 2026. Of that, $6.2 billion — 57.3 per cent — went to NATO countries. The association also said the three largest destination markets were all NATO allies, though it did not name them.

The Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) gave a similar picture for calendar 2025. Its chairman, Haluk Görgün, put defence and aviation exports at $10.05 billion for the year, of which $5.6 billion — 56 per cent — went to the European Union, NATO members and the United States combined.

Two caveats matter before anyone reads too much into those numbers, and we return to both below: the totals mix platforms with components and civil aerospace work, and neither figure is broken down by individual country.

Which NATO members have bought what

The table below covers signed or completed contracts only. Expressions of interest, evaluations and press-reported negotiations are excluded, and noted separately afterwards.

Turkish equipment also serves with three non-NATO European or neighbouring forces that are frequently confused with alliance members in coverage of this subject — Ukraine, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina all operate Bayraktar TB2s, and none of the three is in NATO.

The sequence of firsts, 2021 to 2026

Read as a list, the contracts above look like eight unrelated national decisions. Read in order, they show a supplier moving up the value chain: sensors and vehicles first, then aircraft and ships, then a contract with the alliance itself.

Spain: the contract that changed the category

Spain’s Integrated Training System–Combat (ITS-C) programme is the single most important data point in this list, and the most widely misreported. Two figures circulate because they measure different things. In October 2025 the Spanish Council of Ministers authorised the programme with a ceiling of €3.12 billion for up to 45 HÜRJET-based trainers. The contract actually signed on 30 December 2025 covers 30 aircraft plus the training system, at €2.4 billion, awarded to a joint venture of Airbus Defence and Space España and Turkish Aerospace.

The structure is as significant as the value. Turkish Aerospace supplies airframes; Airbus primes the programme and leads the Spanish training system. Türkiye entered a Western European market by accepting the supplier role rather than the prime role — a trade that is worth understanding in detail if you are assessing where HÜRJET sits in the global advanced jet trainer market.

Romania and Estonia: the land-systems core

Romania’s November 2024 order for 1,059 Otokar COBRA II mine-resistant vehicles, worth roughly €857 million, is the largest single-item land vehicle export contract in the history of the Turkish defence industry. It is also the clearest illustration of where Turkish industry competes best inside NATO: protected wheeled vehicles in volume, at a unit price and delivery cadence that Western European manufacturers have struggled to match. Our technical and export profile of the Otokar COBRA II sets out the vehicle’s configuration and the wider customer list.

Estonia made the same calculation on a smaller scale. In October 2023 the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments signed contracts worth €200 million with Otokar and Nurol Makina for 130 ARMA 6×6 armoured personnel carriers and 100 NMS 4×4 tactical vehicles. Deliveries began in late 2024 and the vehicles are equipping the Estonian Defence Forces’ 2nd Infantry Brigade — a front-line NATO formation on the alliance’s eastern edge.

Hungary went further than buying. Nurol Makina has delivered 106 Gidrán vehicles — a Hungarian configuration of the Ejder Yalçın — since 2020, and in March 2026 signed an arrangement to build roughly 800 more inside Hungary with the automotive firm Rába and 4iG Space and Defence Technologies. If that line is completed as announced, Turkish armoured vehicle designs will be in series production inside the European Union, drawing on EU supply chains. That plant would join a wider network of Turkish defence production sites outside Türkiye, and it reflects the commercial logic set out in our analysis of why countries buy Turkish armoured vehicles.

Poland: the pattern that others copied

Poland ordered 24 Bayraktar TB2s in 2021 for $270 million — four systems of six aircraft each, with ground control stations, electro-optical sensors and depot-level maintenance facilities. It was the first NATO and EU member state to order the type, and Baykar chief executive Haluk Bayraktar described the completion of deliveries in May 2024 as the company’s first completed high-technology UCAV export to a country that is a member of both.

The relationship has since moved beyond drones. ASELSAN signed a $410 million electronic warfare contract with Poland’s State Treasury Armament Agency on 19 December 2025, covering radar and communications electronic support and attack systems, unmanned-platform EW payloads and counter-UAS equipment, according to EDR Magazine. At MSPO 2026 in Kielce this week the company added a follow-on agreement with the Polish vehicle manufacturer AMZ Kutno for further ARSUS reconnaissance and surveillance systems. Envanter Medya’s Turkish-language survey of ASELSAN’s export customer countries traces how that Polish business fits into the company’s wider 95-country footprint.

September 2026 added a third strand, and it is the one to watch rather than to over-read. At MSPO 2026 in Kielce, MKE and Poland’s state conglomerate PGZ signed a memorandum of understanding on 10 September covering MKE’s TOLGA short-range air defence system and joint work on non-kinetic counter-drone effects. It is a framework, not a contract: no value, quantity or timeline has been disclosed, and nothing has been sold. It is also the second European partnership MKE has sought for TOLGA this year, after an arrangement with Hungary’s HT Division — which puts short-range air defence into the same pattern of Turkish air defence export activity that has so far produced far more agreements than deliveries.

The full Polish file — every signed contract, the Kleszcz integration programme, and the SAN counter-drone competition Turkish industry did not win — is set out in our analysis of Türkiye–Poland defence cooperation.

Poland is the template most other European buyers have followed: start with an unmanned system or a sensor, prove the support chain works, then widen the relationship. For the commercial logic behind that first purchase, see our analysis of why countries buy Turkish drones.

Portugal: the naval breakthrough

On 17 December 2024, STM signed a contract with the Portuguese Navy’s Directorate of Ships for two Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment and logistics support vessels — 137 metres, 11,000 tonnes, 18-plus knots, with hangar space for helicopters and unmanned aircraft. STM describes it as Türkiye’s first naval platform export to a country that is both an EU and a NATO member.

Both hulls are under construction at ADA Shipyard in Istanbul. Steel was cut on the first, N.R.P. Luís de Camões, in November 2025 and her keel was laid in January 2026; steel cutting for the second, N.R.P. D. Dinis (A5212), followed on 18 June 2026. STM is targeting launch in 2027 and delivery in 2028, and used its MSPO 2026 stand to display the design. Envanter Medya’s Turkish-language analysis of the four contract patterns behind Turkish warship export growth puts the Portuguese programme in the context of the wider order book.

What NATO members are not buying

The pattern of who has bought is only half the picture. Four of NATO’s largest defence markets — the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany — have not procured a Turkish-built platform, and there is no public evidence of a competition in which one is being evaluated. France and Germany host their own primes in every category Türkiye exports.

Italy is a special case, and a genuinely interesting one. It has bought nothing, but Baykar owns Piaggio Aerospace outright and holds a 50/50 joint venture, LBA Systems, with Leonardo. Italy has become a manufacturing base for Turkish products rather than a customer for them — a structure covered in our Baykar company profile.

The United States is the most instructive gap. The US Navy has been assessing the Istanbul-class frigate design as one reference point for a future warship programme, which is an evaluation and nothing more. And the highest-profile Turkish industrial involvement in a US programme ended badly. The Turkish metal-forming firm Repkon supplied the flow-forming production technology for the US Army’s Universal Artillery Projectile Lines plant at Mesquite, Texas, opened in 2024 at a cost of about $469 million. As of March 2026 the plant had not produced a single 155 mm projectile metal part meeting contract specification. In mid-2026, The War Zone reported that General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems was unwinding the Repkon partnership, replacing the equipment and committing $200 million of its own money.

Any honest account of Turkish industry inside NATO has to include that case. It is the clearest counter-example to the argument that Turkish manufacturing know-how transfers cleanly into allied programmes.

The traffic also runs the other way, and a NATO-focused page that ignores it is incomplete. Türkiye is itself a customer of allied industry in categories it cannot yet cover: the six Reis-class boats at Gölcük are built under a German Type 214 design licence that prevents Türkiye re-exporting them, the gas turbines in most Turkish warships are American, and the main diesels are German. Inside the alliance the relationship is an exchange of dependencies rather than a one-way export flow — which is also why the industrial terms attached to Turkish sales, examined in our study of what Turkish defence offsets are actually worth, matter as much to allied buyers as the headline prices.

What the export figures do not tell you

The $6.2 billion NATO figure is real, but it is not a platform sales number. Türkiye’s official statistics combine defence and aerospace, which means civil aircraft structures, engine components, subsystems and ammunition are counted alongside drones and armoured vehicles. Turkish suppliers sit deep in Western aerospace supply chains, and much of the value flowing to the United States and the United Kingdom is of that kind — subcontracted work, not weapons sales to their armed forces.

Neither the exporters’ association nor SSB publishes a country-by-country breakdown, so the composition of the $6.2 billion cannot be verified from open sources. Treat it as evidence that trade with the alliance is large and growing, not as evidence that eight European armies are re-equipping with Turkish weapons.

A second limitation: several of the biggest items in the table are contracts, not deliveries. Spain has no HÜRJET. Portugal has no ship. Hungary’s 800-vehicle production line does not exist yet. On current schedules the first Spanish aircraft and the first Portuguese hull both arrive in 2028, and programmes of that size slip. Judge this list again in 2028.

What comes next

Three things are worth watching over the next 18 months.

First, whether the NSPA contract stays an isolated case. In July 2026, at the NATO Defence Industry Forum in Ankara, SSB chairman Haluk Görgün said Türkiye had signed agreements covering strike capabilities, integrated air and missile defence, space and surveillance, critical raw materials and UAV superiority, with ROKETSAN, ASELSAN, STM and TÜBİTAK named among the participants, as reported by Daily Sabah. Those are framework arrangements for jointly developed alliance projects, not contracts with values attached, and the distinction should not be blurred.

Second, whether Turkish air defence enters the European market. Türkiye is fielding a layered national architecture — Çelik Kubbe, or Steel Dome — that has no export customer inside NATO. Air defence is the category European states are buying most urgently, and it is the obvious next test.

Third, whether the Hungarian production model spreads. Building inside the EU changes the political economics of a purchase for governments under pressure to spend defence budgets at home. Baykar has already done this in Italy through Piaggio. If Nurol Makina makes it work in Hungary, other Turkish primes will be asked for the same terms.

FAQ

How many NATO countries use Turkish weapons?

Eight NATO members besides Türkiye have signed contracts for Turkish-built defence equipment: Spain, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Portugal, Croatia and Albania. NATO’s own procurement agency, NSPA, has also contracted ASELSAN for IFF interrogators. Small component purchases are not itemised publicly, so the real number of countries buying something Turkish is higher.

Which NATO country bought the most Turkish equipment?

By value, Spain — €2.4 billion for 30 HÜRJET advanced jet trainers, signed on 30 December 2025. By quantity, Romania, with 1,059 Otokar COBRA II mine-resistant vehicles ordered in November 2024 for roughly €857 million.

Which NATO members operate the Bayraktar TB2?

Türkiye, Poland (24 aircraft, deliveries completed May 2024), Romania (18 aircraft, first system received June 2024), Croatia (six aircraft, in service September 2025) and Albania (three aircraft, in service March 2024). Ukraine, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina also operate the type but are not NATO members.

Has Türkiye sold warships to a NATO country?

Yes. STM is building two AOR+ logistics support ships for the Portuguese Navy under a contract signed on 17 December 2024, which the company describes as Türkiye’s first naval platform export to a state that is both an EU and a NATO member. Delivery is targeted for 2028. Separately, the US Navy has been assessing the Turkish Istanbul-class frigate design as a reference for a future programme — an evaluation, not an order.

What share of Turkish defence exports goes to NATO countries?

57.3 per cent, or $6.2 billion of $10.9 billion, in the 12 months to 31 May 2026, according to the Turkish Defence and Aerospace Industry Exporters’ Association. The figure combines defence and aerospace, so it includes civil aircraft components and subcontracted work as well as weapons.

Do France, Germany, the UK or the United States buy Turkish weapons?

Not as platforms. None has procured a Turkish-built system for its armed forces, and no public competition is under way. Turkish firms do supply components into Western aerospace and defence supply chains, and Italy hosts Turkish-owned manufacturing through Baykar’s ownership of Piaggio Aerospace and its LBA Systems joint venture with Leonardo — an industrial relationship rather than a procurement one.

Sources

• Anadolu Agency, “Turkish defense exports near $11B as sales to NATO allies accelerate,” 1 July 2026 — aa.com.tr
• Anadolu Agency, “Türkiye’s defense, aviation exports exceed $10B threshold in 2025” (SSB chairman Haluk Görgün) — aa.com.tr
• Naval News, “STM Holds Steel-Cutting Ceremony for Second Portuguese Logistics Support Ship,” June 2026 — navalnews.com
• Romanian Ministry of National Defence, “Romanian Land Forces initiated the reception procedures of the first Bayraktar TB2 system” — english.mapn.ro
• Baykar, “Romania awards $321 million contract for Turkish TB2 combat drones” — baykartech.com
• The Defense Post, “Turkey Delivers Last Batch of Bayraktar Drones to Poland,” 23 May 2024 — thedefensepost.com
• EDR Magazine, “Aselsan signs 410 million USD export contract with Poland” — edrmagazine.eu
• The Defense Post, “NATO Taps Turkey’s Aselsan for Air Defense IFF Tech,” 28 January 2026 — thedefensepost.com
• The Defense Post, “Turkey’s Nurol Makina to Produce 800 Gidran Vehicles in Hungary,” 4 March 2026 — thedefensepost.com
• Janes, “Estonia orders Nurol Makina NMS 4×4 vehicles and Otokar Arma 6×6 APCs” — janes.com
• The Defense Post, “Croatia to Procure Six Bayraktar TB2 Drones for $95 Million,” 19 November 2024 — thedefensepost.com
• Defense News, “Albania orders three armed TB2 drones,” 22 December 2022 — defensenews.com
• The War Zone, “New $500M Artillery Shell Plant Failed To Produce Any 155mm Parts,” 14 July 2026 — twz.com
• Yeni Şafak, “Roketsan, Aselsan back NATO strategic defense projects” (NATO Defence Industry Forum, Ankara, 7 July 2026) — en.yenisafak.com
• Daily Sabah, “Top Turkish defense firms welcome NATO deals on strategic projects” (NATO Defence Industry Forum, Ankara, 7 July 2026) — dailysabah.com