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Is Türkiye a Top 10 Arms Exporter? What Rankings Show

No. On the only global ranking of arms exporters that is compiled independently and published every year, Türkiye sits 11th. SIPRI’s Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025 fact sheet, released in March 2026, gives Türkiye 1.8 per cent of global arms exports for 2021–25, behind Spain on 2.3 per cent and South Korea on 3.0 per cent. What makes the question worth asking is everything around that number: Türkiye’s share doubled from 0.9 per cent in 2016–20, its delivery volume rose 122 per cent — the second-fastest growth of any top-11 supplier — and Ankara’s own accounts show close to $11 billion of defence and aerospace exports in the twelve months to September 2026. Four different measuring systems produce four different answers, and none of them is lying.

DEFENCETÜRKIYE DATA BOX

Subject: Türkiye’s position among global arms exporters

SIPRI rank, 2021–25: 11th, 1.8% of global arms exports

Previous period (2016–20): 0.9% — volume up 122%

Türkiye’s own export figure: $10.94bn, rolling 12 months to September 2026

Calendar 2025 exports: $10.054bn (goods $9.87bn, services $184m)

Largest customers by volume, 2021–25: Pakistan 16%, UAE 12%, Ukraine 8.4%

Turkish firms in SIPRI’s Top 100 (2024 data): five, $10.1bn combined arms revenue

Also ranks: 24th largest arms importer, 1.2% of world imports

The four numbers, and why they disagree

Anyone searching for Türkiye’s place in the arms trade runs into figures that sit between 1.8 per cent and $20 billion, and they are not alternative estimates of the same thing. They measure four separate quantities.

1. SIPRI’s trend-indicator value: the 11th-place number

SIPRI is the only institution publishing a consistent annual table of arms suppliers, and it is the source behind almost every “top 10 arms exporters” headline. Its 2021–25 table puts the United States at 42 per cent, France at 9.8, Russia at 6.8, Germany 5.7, China 5.6, Italy 5.1, Israel 4.4, the United Kingdom 3.4, South Korea 3.0, Spain 2.3 and Türkiye 11th at 1.8.

The critical point, which almost every secondary write-up drops, is what SIPRI’s unit measures. The trend-indicator value is built from the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and, in SIPRI’s own words, “is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer.” SIPRI states that TIV figures “do not represent sales prices for arms transfers” and warns against comparing them directly with GDP, military expenditure, sales values or the financial value of export licences.

So 11th place is a statement about the military weight of what Türkiye physically delivered over five years, not about what Turkish industry earned. It also runs on a five-year moving window, which deliberately smooths out single large years — useful for spotting trends, slow to register a sudden surge.

2. Türkiye’s own export accounts: the $10.9 billion number

Ankara publishes monthly customs-based export figures for the defence and aerospace sector. Haluk Görgün, head of the Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB), reported on 4 October 2026 that September exports reached $634 million, up 10.7 per cent year on year, that January–September stood at $6.92 billion, up 15.6 per cent, and that the rolling twelve-month figure had reached $10.94 billion, up 30 per cent. Calendar 2025 closed at $10.054 billion — $9.87 billion of goods plus $184 million of services — against $7.15 billion in 2024.

This is a real, auditable sales figure. The problem for ranking purposes is that no equivalent table exists for everyone else. France, Israel, South Korea and the United States each publish export or order figures on different definitions — some count orders, some deliveries, some licences, some include services, some do not. There is no referee. A country can honestly report $10.9 billion and still have no verifiable claim to a numbered global position, because the comparison set does not exist in a consistent form.

3. Company revenue lists: two Top 100s that disagree with each other

The third approach ranks companies rather than countries, and it produces the clearest illustration of how much methodology matters, because the two best-known lists do not agree about Türkiye.

SIPRI’s Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies for 2024, published on 1 December 2025, listed five Turkish firms — the highest number ever — with combined arms revenues of $10.1 billion, up 11 per cent. ASELSAN ranked 47th on $3.47 billion, a 24 per cent rise that SIPRI attributes mainly to a 65 per cent jump in exports; Turkish Aerospace 65th on $2.16 billion; Baykar 73rd on $1.9 billion; ROKETSAN 87th on $1.39 billion; and MKE 93rd on $1.21 billion, entering the list for the first time after sitting at 102nd.

The Defense News Top 100 published in 2026 also finds five Turkish companies — but not the same five, in the same order, on the same numbers. It places ASELSAN 40th on $4.46 billion, Turkish Aerospace 48th on $3.65 billion, ARCA Savunma 53rd as a new entry at around $3 billion, ROKETSAN 64th on $2.37 billion and MKE 81st on $1.42 billion, for a combined $14.9 billion. Baykar does not appear at all, because it is privately held and does not disclose revenue — SIPRI includes it on an estimate, Defense News does not estimate. ARCA, conversely, is in the Defense News list and absent from SIPRI’s. Our breakdown of the Defense News list goes through the individual entries.

Two reputable lists, the same country, a $4.8 billion gap. Neither is wrong; they count different revenue and treat non-disclosing firms differently.

4. Order intake: the $15–20 billion number

The largest figures in circulation are contract signings, not deliveries or revenue. Görgün told a subcontractor and supply chain workshop in Bursa on 17 October 2026 that Turkish companies had signed $15 billion in new defence contracts during 2026 and that he expected $20 billion by year-end; the comparable 2025 figure was $17.8 billion, itself 78 per cent above 2024. He also put outstanding domestic orders above $13.4 billion.

Order intake is a forward-looking indicator of revenue three to seven years out. It belongs in a different column from export earnings, and conflating the two is the single most common error in coverage of Turkish defence numbers.

The four measures side by side

Measure	What it actually counts	Latest figure for Türkiye	Position	Source and date
SIPRI trend-indicator value, 2021–25	Military volume of major arms delivered, not money	1.8% of global arms exports	11th	SIPRI, March 2026
National export earnings	Customs value of goods and services exported	$10.94bn, 12 months to Sept 2026	No comparable global table exists	SSB, 4 October 2026
SIPRI Top 100 companies, 2024	Arms-only revenue of individual firms, estimates included	$10.1bn across five firms	ASELSAN 47th; five firms listed	SIPRI, 1 December 2025
Defense News Top 100	Defence revenue of individual firms, no estimates for non-disclosers	$14.9bn across five firms	ASELSAN 40th; Baykar absent	Defense News, 2026 edition
New contract intake	Orders signed; revenue arrives years later	$15bn in 2026 to mid-October	No comparable global table exists	SSB, 17 October 2026

WHY IT MATTERS

For anyone assessing Turkish industry as a supplier, the ranking question is a proxy for a harder one: is this a durable second-tier exporter or a drone-driven spike? The honest reading of the evidence is the former but with narrow foundations. Türkiye’s export volume more than doubled across two five-year windows while most established suppliers grew in single digits, and the customer base now includes NATO members and EU states. But 11th place on volume, 24th place on imports and a top-three customer list of Pakistan, the UAE and Ukraine all describe a supplier that is still building breadth.

Growth is where Türkiye genuinely leads

Rank and momentum point in different directions. Among the eleven largest suppliers in 2021–25, only Italy grew its delivery volume faster than Türkiye. Russia’s exports collapsed by 64 per cent; the established Western suppliers grew between 6.7 and 27 per cent; Türkiye grew 122 per cent.

Chart: DefenceTürkiye, built from SIPRI, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2025, Table 1 (March 2026).

Two caveats keep that chart honest. Growth from a small base is easier than growth from a large one — Türkiye added roughly 0.9 percentage points of global share, while the United States added about six. And Poland, outside the top 11, grew 4,387 per cent on a near-zero 2016–20 base, which shows how little a percentage change alone conveys.

Where Türkiye already behaves like a major supplier

Region by region, the picture changes. SIPRI records Türkiye as the third-largest supplier of major arms to sub-Saharan Africa in 2021–25, with 11 per cent of subregional imports, behind China on 22 per cent and Russia on 12. That is a genuinely top-tier position in a market where several traditional suppliers have retreated, and it rests substantially on armed UAVs and armoured vehicles sold with training and credit packages rather than on single large platforms.

Europe has moved from a closed market to an active one, with Poland, Romania and Spain all placing orders — a shift we examine in our review of Turkish arms sales in Europe. Ankara’s own accounting puts about $5.6 billion, or 56 per cent, of 2025 exports into the EU, NATO members and the United States.

The counterpoint belongs in the same paragraph. SIPRI’s regional analysis also names Türkiye among at least five identified suppliers of major arms to the Sudanese armed forces during the civil war that began in 2023, alongside Belarus, Iran, Kyrgyzstan and the UAE. Export breadth into conflict-affected states carries reputational exposure that a ranking does not capture.

What the ranking hides: Türkiye is also a significant importer

The same SIPRI fact sheet lists Türkiye as the 24th largest arms importer in 2021–25, taking 1.2 per cent of world imports, with volume down 9.7 per cent. Its three largest suppliers were Germany at 31 per cent, Spain at 29 and Italy at 19 — the United States is absent from the top three, a direct consequence of Türkiye’s removal from the F-35 programme and the arms-transfer frictions that followed.

The Spanish relationship runs both ways and is easy to miss: Spain ranks 10th among exporters, immediately ahead of Türkiye, and Türkiye is Spain’s second-largest customer at 16 per cent of Spanish arms exports. Türkiye is simultaneously a rising exporter and a substantial buyer from European suppliers, which is why the question of production independence gets a more nuanced answer than headline localisation rates suggest.

BUYER VIEW

What the ranking does and does not tell a procurement team evaluating Turkish suppliers:

Industrial depth is real but concentrated. Five firms account for the overwhelming majority of listed arms revenue. Below them the supplier base is wide — SSB cites more than 16,000 domestic companies working with the main contractors over three years — but thinly capitalised.
Scale is mid-tier, not top-tier. Combined Turkish arms revenue of $10–15 billion compares with single European primes of similar size. Programme-level capacity questions should be asked per factory, not inferred from national totals.
Order intake outruns deliveries. With $15 billion signed in 2026 against roughly $11 billion of annual exports, queue position matters. Ask where a new order sits in the delivery sequence.
Growth rate is the strongest signal. A 122 per cent volume increase across two five-year windows indicates sustained demand rather than a single conflict-driven year.
Rankings are not a substitute for export-control due diligence. Foreign subsystems in a Turkish platform can still attract third-country licence requirements regardless of where Türkiye ranks.

This is open-source editorial analysis, not procurement advice to any government or company.

What would actually move Türkiye into the top 10

Arithmetic, not ambition, sets the bar. To overtake Spain on SIPRI’s 2021–25 measure Türkiye needs roughly another 0.5 percentage points of global export volume; to reach South Korea’s 3.0 per cent it needs to add about two-thirds again to its delivered volume. Both are plausible within one or two reporting windows if current order intake converts, and both depend on heavy platforms rather than on more UAVs — SIPRI’s volume index weights a corvette or a combat aircraft far above a tactical drone.

That is why frigate exports, the HÜRJET order from Spain and armoured vehicle contracts matter more to the ranking than drone sales do, even though drones built the reputation. The comparison with South Korea, whose exports are concentrated in exactly those heavy categories, is set out in our side-by-side of the two rising exporters. Employment data points the same way: the sector’s headcount, covered in our analysis of who works in Turkish defence, has grown fastest in shipbuilding and aerostructures rather than in UAV assembly.

Readers who follow the Turkish-language debate will find Envanter Medya’s assessment of what changed in Turkish defence exports under Haluk Görgün a useful companion, and its study of the SMEs that form the invisible backbone of the supply chain explains where the capacity behind these totals physically sits.

FAQ

Is Türkiye a top 10 arms exporter?

Not on the standard measure. SIPRI ranks Türkiye 11th among arms exporters for 2021–25, with 1.8 per cent of global arms exports, behind Spain (2.3 per cent) and South Korea (3.0 per cent). It is the closest Türkiye has come to the top 10, up from 0.9 per cent in 2016–20.

How much does Türkiye earn from defence exports?

Türkiye reported $10.054 billion in defence and aerospace exports for calendar 2025 and $10.94 billion for the twelve months to September 2026. These are national customs-based sales figures and are not directly comparable with SIPRI’s volume rankings.

Why do SIPRI and Türkiye’s own figures tell different stories?

SIPRI’s trend-indicator value measures the military volume of weapons delivered, using known unit production costs as a common unit. SIPRI states explicitly that it does not represent sales prices and should not be compared with sales values. Türkiye’s figure is actual money received for goods and services. They answer different questions.

Which countries buy the most Turkish weapons?

By delivered volume over 2021–25, SIPRI puts Pakistan first at 16 per cent of Türkiye’s arms exports, the UAE second at 12 per cent and Ukraine third at 8.4 per cent. By value, Türkiye’s own accounts place about 56 per cent of 2025 exports in the EU, NATO members and the United States.

How many Turkish companies are in the global top 100 defence firms?

Five, on both major lists, though not the same five. SIPRI’s Top 100 for 2024 lists ASELSAN (47th), Turkish Aerospace (65th), Baykar (73rd), ROKETSAN (87th) and MKE (93rd), with $10.1 billion of combined arms revenue. The Defense News Top 100 published in 2026 lists ASELSAN, Turkish Aerospace, ARCA Savunma, ROKETSAN and MKE, with $14.9 billion combined and no entry for Baykar, which does not disclose revenue.

Is Türkiye also an arms importer?

Yes. SIPRI ranks Türkiye the 24th largest arms importer for 2021–25, at 1.2 per cent of world imports, with Germany, Spain and Italy as its three largest suppliers. The United States does not appear in that top three.

Is Türkiye’s arms export growth the fastest in the world?

No, but it is among the fastest of established suppliers. Across the eleven largest exporters, only Italy grew faster between 2016–20 and 2021–25. Several smaller suppliers, Poland above all, posted far larger percentage increases from near-zero bases.