Türkiye Is Building a Space Programme Around the Moon and a Somali Launch Site

Türkiye’s space ambitions used to be described in the future tense. In the past two years several of them have moved into the past tense: a Turkish astronaut has lived on the International Space Station, a communications satellite carrying domestic payload work is in geostationary orbit, and a lunar spacecraft is going through environmental testing. What ties these pieces together is the National Space Programme, a ten-year plan run by the Turkish Space Agency (TUA) under the Ministry of Industry and Technology.

This guide explains what the programme contains, who does the work, which parts are delivered and which are still promises. Where a figure comes from a single report or a press summary, the text says so.

What Is the National Space Programme?

The programme sets out ten goals. According to published summaries of the plan, they include bringing satellite production under a single framework, sending a rover to the Moon, building a spaceport, flying a Turkish astronaut to the ISS, creating a regional positioning and timing system, building the infrastructure for space-weather research, learning to observe and track objects in orbit from the ground, and growing a space industry ecosystem.

The stated policy principles are independent access to space, national independence in critical technologies, a contribution to science, peaceful use, soft power, commercial benefit and public awareness. The language is broader than defence, but the overlap with military needs is obvious: reconnaissance imagery, secure communications and timing signals serve both sides.

TUA itself is small. An Italian ISPI analysis counted about 62 administrative staff, with the heavy engineering carried by TÜBİTAK UZAY and industry. That split matters when reading the programme: the agency coordinates and sets priorities, while institutes and companies build the hardware. For the research side, see our piece on how TÜBİTAK powers Türkiye’s defence research.

Who Leads Turkish Space Policy?

TUA was created in December 2018 and began work in 2019 under its first president, Serdar Hüseyin Yıldırım. Yusuf Kıraç took over in October 2023. Recent reporting on the agency’s roadmap and staffing is covered in our note on the agency’s new period.

Wikipedia’s entry, which tracks public budget documents, puts the agency’s 2026 allocation at roughly 8.7 billion lira. The ISPI analysis adds a caution: it found that the capital-intensive goals of the plan had not received clearly earmarked appropriations in the state budget at the time of writing. Treat that as an analyst’s reading of the budget, not an official statement, but it helps explain why timelines for the biggest items keep moving.

What Has Already Been Delivered?

Three results stand out.

A Turkish astronaut on the ISS. Alper Gezeravcı flew on Axiom Mission 3 aboard a SpaceX vehicle and reached the station on 19 January 2024. His stay lasted a little over 21 days. A second candidate, Tuva Cihangir Atasever, flew a suborbital flight of about 15 minutes on a Virgin Galactic mission. Both rides were bought from foreign commercial providers, which is exactly the dependency the programme wants to reduce.

Satellites in orbit. Türkiye operates earth-observation spacecraft including İMECE, with data flow from the domestic observation satellite continuing, and the older GÖKTÜRK series, whose replacements are still years away. On the communications side, Türksat 6A took the country’s active satellite count to nine, as covered in our report on military satellite communication after Türksat 6A.

A diplomatic footing. Türkiye takes part in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization. In addition, SatNews reported that Türkiye became the 71st signatory of the Artemis Accords on 31 August 2026, at a ceremony at NASA Headquarters attended by Minister Mehmet Fatih Kacır and TUA’s Kıraç. The signing places Türkiye among the countries working under NASA’s lunar framework, though it does not by itself commit the country to any specific hardware contribution.

How Does the Lunar Programme Work?

The Lunar Research Programme, known as AYAP, is the most visible element. It has two phases. AYAP-1 is meant to enter lunar orbit and finish with a controlled impact, often described as a hard landing, on the surface. AYAP-2 is a later mission to put a rover down with a soft landing; Wikipedia lists it for the early 2030s, and that date should be read as a target.

The launch date has slipped. Anadolu Agency originally reported a 2026 launch. A more recent SatellitePro ME report points to early 2027 from NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida. According to that report:

• the spacecraft weighs about 3.5 tonnes;
• it uses a domestically developed hybrid propulsion system for orbit raising and controlled deceleration;
• it should take about two months to reach a 100-kilometre polar lunar orbit;
• an initial three-month science phase could be extended to as long as 18 months;
• Turkish Aerospace is carrying out environmental testing, and domestic content is put at around 80 percent, drawing on İMECE and Türksat 6A experience;
• the Swedish Institute of Space Physics supplies a neutral-atom telescope, while the other science instruments are Turkish-built.

SatNews adds that TÜBİTAK UZAY designed the spacecraft and that Thales Alenia Space provides communications equipment. The science goals named by Turkish officials centre on lunar water, the magnetic environment, surface composition, temperature and radiation.

Turkish Aerospace’s role in the lunar craft fits its position as the country’s main aerospace integrator; our TUSAŞ company profile covers the rest of that portfolio.

Why Is Türkiye Building a Spaceport in Somalia?

Launch access is the part of the programme with the strongest sovereignty argument. President Erdoğan announced that Somalia would host the facility, and first-phase construction was reported to start around the end of 2025 under a bilateral agreement that allocates land to Türkiye. SatNews cites a build of roughly 12 months and a target of operational readiness in early 2027, which is an ambitious schedule for a new launch site.

The reasoning is physical. The Earth spins fastest at the equator, so a rocket launched there gets a speed boost and needs less fuel to lift a given payload. Officials also cite year-round launch weather, low air and sea traffic, and trajectories over open water that avoid populated land.

The plan has three stages: national launches of Turkish satellites, growth of domestic rocket and propulsion capability, and finally commercial services for outside customers. Reports so far do not name a launch vehicle, and none of the sources checked give a funding figure. A spaceport without a rocket is a half-answer, so the vehicle question is the one to watch. The hybrid-propulsion work on the lunar craft is related in principle, but no official source links it to a launcher.

What Else Is in the Pipeline?

• Regional positioning and timing system. A Türkiye-focused system for navigation and timing services. The ISPI analysis describes a multi-year effort reaching completion around 2031.
• Türksat 7A. SatellitePro ME reports that development of the next communications satellite has begun.
• İMECE-2 and İMECE-3. The same report places further earth-observation satellites in the design phase.
• Space technology zone in Ankara. A development area intended to host industry and research.
• International Astronautical Congress. SatNews says Türkiye was to host the 77th congress in Antalya on 5 to 9 October 2026.

How Does the Space Programme Connect to Defence?

Officially the programme is civil and peaceful. In practice, the same institutes and firms that build İMECE, GÖKTÜRK and Türksat satellites also serve the armed forces. Imagery drives targeting and surveillance; secure satellite links carry drone and naval traffic; independent timing signals reduce exposure to foreign navigation services. A national launch site would also remove the need to book rides on foreign rockets for sensitive payloads.

The weak points are mostly money and time. The lunar date has already moved by about a year, the capital-heavy goals lack clear budget lines according to ISPI, and Türkiye has so far relied on SpaceX, Axiom and Virgin Galactic for crewed flights. If the Somalia site and a domestic launcher arrive on schedule, much of that dependency starts to shrink. If they do not, Türkiye will keep owning satellites it cannot launch itself.